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“Don’t Worry. These girls have been raped once.”1
Analyzing Sexual Violence in the Bosnian Genocide and the Response of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Madeline Brashear

Sexual violence in wartime has existed throughout history. However, it was
treated as a byproduct of war, which denied its severity and culpability. It was not until
1995 that sexual violence was addressed and prosecuted in an international criminal
tribunal. At the dawn of the 21st century, women began to receive justice for the crimes
committed against them in wartime. The rape, forced impregnation, and sexual slavery
perpetrated against women in the Bosnian genocide initiated the prosecution of sexual
violence in an international setting. This was because sexual violence was used as a
weapon of war. The Bosnian war (1992-1995) drew international attention to the issues
of gender violence, causing the United Nations (UN) to come under substantial pressure
to condemn and end the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through the force of
Western humanitarian organizations and the media, the UN was pressured to respond to
the atrocities committed against women in the Bosnian genocide. This response resulted
in the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), which put the prosecution of sexual violence and the maintenance of women’s
rights on the UN agenda. With Western media and aid organizations exposing and

“’Don’t Worry. These girls have been raped once.’ Zlata, 23, recalled one of the officers
telling the Seselj followers. According to the victims, preparations for the mass rapes
began as early on the morning of June 17 (1992)…” Roy Gutman, A Witness to
Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia.
Pennsylvania State University (1993), 70
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condemning the gender violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN, through the ICTY,
focused its authority on addressing this specific violence.
Historical analysis of the ICTY and sexual violence in the Bosnian genocide has
heretofore focused on the failures and successes of the ICTY, and has done so using a
feminist framework. Kelly Askin argued that “the crimes are usually investigated and
indicted only after concerted pressure by women’s rights organizations and feminist
scholars to prosecute the crimes.”2 Askin and Heidi Haddad both focused on the
influence of women’s rights organizations; however, Haddad expands the argument to
include larger advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch.3 These scholars observed
the problem through the lens of feminist advocacy. For example, Karen Engle
concentrated her analysis on the discord among feminists in defining how rape should
have been prosecuted, claiming “Feminists had both a direct and indirect impact on the
development of international criminal law, particularly on the ways it addressed rapes
that occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”4 Using this same interpretative lens, this paper
intends to expand the field of analysis to include the media and various political agencies.
Previous analysis of the ICTY focused on aspects of the impact of advocacy, however it
did not look at the larger picture, including political organizations, media, and advocacy
organizations. Feminist organizations have been recognized for their role in condemning
sexual violence in Bosnia and their influence on the ICTY. Furthermore, an analysis on

2

Kelly Askin, “Prosecuting Wartime Rape and other Gender-Related Crimes under
International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles,” Berkeley Journal of
International Law Volume 21 no. 2 (2003).
3
Heidi Haddad, “Mobilizing the Will to Prosecute: Crimes of Rape at the Yugoslav and
Rwandan Tribunals,” Human Rights Review 12 no. 1 (2011), 120.
4
Karen Engle, “Feminism and its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, “ The American Journal of International Law 99 no. 4 (2005).
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how the ICTY prosecuted sexual violence and its influence on subsequent international
tribunals is necessary.
Rape was not addressed in international criminal tribunals previous to the ICTY,
and therefore no international policy existed on the prosecution of rape and sexual
violence. Neither the Nuremberg Tribunal nor the Tokyo Tribunal fully addressed the
innumerable instances of rape, which occurred in World War II.5 The absence of female
policy makers and enforcers largely explained the lack of jurisdiction on gender violence,
as rape in wartime was viewed as an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of the
conflict. Additionally, rape was deemed as a crime against personal honor. The 1907
Hague Convention did not mention rape, however, Article 46 states “family honour and
rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and
practice, must be respected.”6 Further, the 1949 Geneva Convention and 1977 Additional
Protocols categorized rape as an attack on the woman’s honor. Article 27 of the Geneva
Convention states, “women shall be especially protected against any attack on their
honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”7
In 1979, the UN established the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), though this document made no mention of

5

Richard Goldstone and Estelle Debon, “Engendering Accountability: Gender Crimes
Under International Criminal Law,” New England Journal of Public Policy Vol.19
(2003), 123.
6 International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 18 October 1907,
Article 46.
7
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August
1949, 75 UNTS 287Article 27.

https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol9/iss1/5

4

Brashear: “Don’t Worry. These girls have been raped once.” Analyzing Sexual

Brashear 4
rape or sexual violence.8 Sexual violence against women was eventually addressed in the
1989 CEDAW, General Recommendation 12.9 The establishment of CEDAW reflected
the developing international women’s rights movement, as by this point feminist
advocacy had begun to take hold in international policy. Despite the Convention and its
mission against the discrimination of women, sexual violence was still used as a tactic of
war in Bosnia, demonstrating that international policy failed to address sexual violence in
its totality. By treating rape as a crime against honor and a by-product of war, rape was
allowed to endure on a global scale.
From 1992 to 1995,during the Bosnian war, genocidal violence took a new form
through the systematic and mandated rape of Bosnian women. Serbian soldiers targeted
and attacked Muslim women using both rape and public humiliation. By committing
these acts, Serbian soldiers intended to force the Muslim Bosnian population from their
homes.10 This tactic was not used sparingly, but was instead implemented from the top of
the Serbian command. From a witness testimony, “Almira said one of her captors told her
they wanted to ‘plant the seeds of Serbs in Bosnia.’”11 Serbian soldiers were encouraged
to rape and commit violence against Bosnian women as part of a tactic, which was
identified and coined as “ethnic cleansing.”12 The purpose of this “ethnic cleansing” was

8

UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249,
9
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 12: Violence against women, 1989.
10
EC Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim women in the Former
Yugoslavia. “Report on Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” European Council,
(Copenhagen: 1993).
11
Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of
“ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia, Pennsylvania State University (1993), 76.
12
Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women’s Human
Rights. New York. (1995), 10.
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to force the Muslim Bosnian population to flee the country, and the Serbian government
discovered that rape was an effective method to achieve their end goal. “Mass rapes
instill terror, so that the victims will never seek to return to their homes and villages.”13
The proliferation of the term “ethnic cleansing” as a euphemism for genocide is
important to note, because while the crimes being committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina
were massive and unacceptable, the delayed reactions by the UN was characteristic of
this conflict. The term “ethnic cleansing” was coined by Bosnian Serb forces to justify
their actions of murder, rape, and pillage carried out against the Muslim Bosnian
population in an attempt to rid the country of this specific group.14 The Commission for
War Crimes defined “ethnic cleansing” as “a conscious policy of an ethnic or religious
group that intends through violent and horrific means to remove the civilian population of
another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”15 The United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) adopted and spread
this term.16 The UN severely condemned the acts of Serbian nationalists, however it was
slow to provide any relief for the victims of this violence. Rape was implemented as a

13

Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic, This Time We Knew: Western Responses to
Genocide in Bosnia. New York: NYU Press (1996), 76.
14
Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report of Women’s Human
Rights, New York (1995), 9.
15
Security Council Resolution 780 established the Commission for War Crimes on 6
October 1992. This commission reported on the crimes committed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. This definition of “ethnic cleansing” was present in the First Interim Report
of the Commission for War Crimes; Interim Report of the Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992).
16 Gregory Kent, “Humanitarian Agencies, Media and the War against Bosnia:
‘neutrality; and framing moral equalization in a genocidal war of expansion,” The
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance,” (2003).
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tool of “ethnic cleansing,;” its purpose was to force the population to abandon their
homes.
Bosnian Serbs were among the first to use rape as a tool of war and genocide in
the form of state policy.
This is also rape as a policy of ethnic uniformity and ethnic conquest, of
annexation and expansion, of acquisition by one nation of other nations. It
is rape because a Serb wants your apartment. Most distinctively, this is rape
as ethnic expansion through forced reproduction.17
Forced impregnation was an integral part of Serbia’s policies of genocide in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and this conflict was the first in which it was used as a form of systematic
and mandated gender violence. “The UN Commission that investigated the rapes in the
former Yugoslavia in January 1993…found 119 cases of pregnancy resulting from
rape…in 104 of the 119 cases the women decided to abort the pregnancy.”18 These
numbers did not represent the actual proportion of women raped and forcibly
impregnated, as underreporting was an issue. The stigma attached to rape, as well as
shame and the fear of reprisal prevented women from reporting rape.19 Rape and forced
impregnation were used in tandem to destroy the female population of Muslim
Bosnians.20 Forced impregnation was a method of “ethnic cleansing” because of the
Serbian notion that forcefully impregnating Bosnian women with Serbian babies would
eradicate the Muslim Bosnian population while expanding the Serbian population. These
17

Catherine MacKinnon, “Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights,” 17 Harvard
Women’s Law Journal Vol. 5 (1994), 13.
18
Alexandra Stiglmayer, Mass rape: the war against women in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press (1996), 135.
19
United Nations, General Assembly, The Situation of human rights in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia: Note by the Secretary General, UN Doc A/48/92 S/25341 (26
February 1993).
20
Siobhan Fisher, “Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation as Genocide” Duke
Law Journal Volume 46 no. 91 (1996), 92.

Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2018

7

Voces Novae, Vol. 9 [2018], Art. 5

Brashear 7
forced impregnations inflicted severe psychological trauma and bodily harm upon the
female victims. International law scholar, Siobhan Fisher identified forced impregnation
as “a military occupation of the womb.”21 Forcefully impregnating and then detaining
women until the pregnancy was too far enough advanced to terminate was a new and
separate gendered attack against women. Not only did these women have to live with the
trauma of being raped, they were forced to carry the child of their attacker.
Rape was used to attack the victim based solely on their gender. The rape of
civilian women in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serbian soldiers was a tool of war in
addition to an act of genocide, contributing to the focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina by
humanitarian and political organizations as well as international media.
More and more journalists spoke with the women and girls concerned,
made known the horrible details of rapes, and quoted large numbers of
victims. Since then the subject has been taken up by investigatory
commissions and human rights organizations, women’s groups, and aid
agencies, but also by politicians.22
Serbian troops further targeted women and performed acts of sexual violence against
them through the institution of rape camps in occupied territories. “A leading Bosnian
Women’s group has charged that upwards of 10,000 Bosnian women are currently being
held in Serb detention camps where their captors rape them repeatedly.”23Amnesty
International reported on the institution of rape camps throughout Bosnian territory,
highlighting the organization and intent of rape within these camps.24 Rape camps were
the sites in which forced impregnation was instituted. These women were purposely

Siobhan Fisher, Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation as Genocide,” 124.
Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War against women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 161
23
Gutman, Witness to Genocide, 69.
24
Amnesty International, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces, AI Index: EUR
63/01/93 (January 1993), 7.
21
22
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detained to be raped, impregnated, and forced to carry the resulting child to term.
“Serbian soldiers, as a routine practice, forcibly impregnated non-Serbian women held in
rape camps, continued to gang-rape these pregnant women for months, and finally
expelled them from Serbian occupied territories when they were near term.”25
The site of these crimes, known as Partizan Sports Hall, was in the center of
Foça, a small predominately Muslim town in Eastern Bosnia. At times, it
was used as a transit factory for women and children about to be deported
from the town. But for two months in 1992, between June and August, it
functioned as a rape camp, holding 74 people, including about 50
women…Partizan was one of dozens of Serb rape camps in Bosnia-some are
said to be still in operation-and it was prominently located, next door to the
police station.26
The use of rape camps by Serbian forces reflected intent of genocide towards Bosnian
women. The reports by humanitarian organizations and Western media on the use of
rape, forced impregnation, and rape camps revealed a concern for women’s rights
through their exposure and condemnation of this gender violence.
It is important to note that the crimes of rape, forced impregnation, and sexual
slavery occurred on both sides of this conflict. Muslim Bosnian forces instituted
detention centers where they beat, raped, and killed Serbian civilians. Sexual violence
was not limited to Serbian forces. However, the systematic and mandated sexual abuse of
women by Serbian forces was committed on a much larger scale. The European
Community (EC) estimated there had been 20,000 victims of rape by Serbian forces in
1993.27 While this did not excuse the sexual violence committed by Bosnian forces, the
scale and nature of the crimes was noteworthy. Furthermore, “most of the abuses
25

Cushman and Stjepan, This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia,
47.
26
Gutman, A Witness to Genocide 157.
27
European Community,“ EC Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim women
in the Former Yugoslavia: Report to EC Foreign Ministers” February 1993.
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attributable to the predominately Muslims forces of the Bosnian government are
perpetuated by individuals and do not appear to be a pre-meditated plan of the Bosnian
authorities.”28 This differed significantly from the Serbian campaign of “ethnic
cleansing.” Bosnian Serb forces utilized sexual violence as a tactic of war and
coordinated “ethnic cleansing” operations to forcibly remove the Muslim population from
the region.29 Serbian troops ran two-thirds of the reported 407 detention camps in Bosnia
and Herzegovina; these camps were part of and practiced the state policy of “ethnic
cleansing.”30 While Serbian actions were more systematized and coordinated than other
documented instances of sexual violence, it remained a crime all too commonly
perpetrated by all parties to the conflict.
In response to the conflict and violence that ensued, humanitarian organizations
embedded themselves within the region to provide aid and sanctuary for the victims and
refugees of the war. Additional activities by these organizations included investigating
and reporting on the “ethnic cleansing” and sexual violence. Humanitarian organizations
were the first to publish reports on the atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Their presence within the region made it impossible to avoid the evidence and knowledge
of “ethnic cleansing,” and awareness of the widespread sexual violence became public
within the first months of the conflict.31 Political institutions and the media began to pay
close attention to the conflict in Bosnia, aided by the humanitarian organizations’
28

Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report of Women’s Human
Rights, New York (1995), 9.
29 Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report of Women’s Human
Rights, 9.
30
Cushman and Mestrovic, This Time we Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in
Bosnia, 52.
31 Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human
Rights, AI Index EUR/63/01/92 (1992).
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documentation and publications of the atrocities committed. These organizations sent
investigatory missions to document the humanitarian situation and to help decide what
type of aid was needed. However, what resulted was a media frenzy when evidence of the
violence against civilians was published.32 The humanitarian organizations affected the
situation in multiple ways. The organizations provided aid to the victims, but also acted
in a political manner when releasing information or allowing media organizations to
participate in their fact finding missions. Ultimately, these organizations became
witnesses to the crimes committed. By publishing the information, humanitarian
organizations were able to sway public opinion, which further put pressure on the
international community. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch used their
presence and prominence to investigate, report, and condemn the sexual violence that was
occurring in Bosnia. The reports published by these organizations put intense pressure on
the UN to address and eradicate gender violence in the region.
Utilizing documented abuse reports, these organization campaigned governments
and political bodies to act against these abuses. They also released 20 publications on
Bosnia from 1993-1994, eight, which mentioned rape, and four that focused exclusively
on rape.33 In addition, they conducted a fact-finding mission in Bosnia in August of 1992
that resulted in the publication of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human
Rights, and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuses by Armed Forces34. The
former reported on the abuses committed by Serbian forces, utilizing interviews and
Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report of Women’s Human
Rights, 9.
33
Heidi Haddad, “Mobilizing the Will to Prosecute: Crimes of Rape at the Yugoslav and
Rwandan Tribunals,” Human Rights Review 12 no. 1 (2011), 125.
34Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights,
AI Index: EUR/63/01/92 (1992)
32
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testimony from the victims.35 The significant findings included that Serbian soldiers
illegally detained civilian non-combatants in detention centers, where torture and
mistreatment was conducted. Furthermore, instances of these detentions occurred where
no fighting was taking place locally.36 This report revealed that atrocities were being
committed against civilians, which alarmed the public and brought greater attention to the
conflict. Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Focus provided greater detail on the human
rights violations regarding abuses against women. Amnesty International acquired
testimony through their officers, journalists, and women’s advocacy groups in Bosnia.37
These records indicated that there was a presence of fact-finders in Bosnia, whose report
brought massive media attention to the human rights violations. This report publicized
that soldiers were encouraged by their commander to forcefully detain, humiliate, and
rape Muslim Bosnian women without any fear of reprimand from their commanding
officers.38 It alluded to the discriminatory nature of the instances of rape, specifically that
“in almost all reported or alleged cases the victims are of different nationality from the
perpetrator, that is women have been singled out for humiliation on account of their
nationality…”39 This report recommended further investigation into the sexual abuses
and support for the victims. In Bosnia, Amnesty International was pertinent in bearing

35Amnesty

International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights,
AI Index: EUR/63/01/92 (1992), 22.
36
Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights,
AI Index: EUR/63/01/92 (1992), 25.
37Amnesty International, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces, AI Index: EUR
63/01/93 (1993), 8.
38
Amnesty International, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces AI Index: EUR
63/01/93 (1993) 8.
39
Amnesty International, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces AI Index EUR
63/01/93 (1993), 8.

https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol9/iss1/5

12

Brashear: “Don’t Worry. These girls have been raped once.” Analyzing Sexual

Brashear 12
witness to the human rights violations that occurred.40 By ensuring international witness
to the atrocities, further attention was brought to the sexual violence on an international
scale.
Human Rights Watch deployed and investigated the violations in Bosnia at the
start of the conflict in 1992. Witness testimony taken by Human Rights Watch was
reported in War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Volume II in 1993.41 Witness testimonies
were additionally published in The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women’s
Human Rights, which included research conducted from 1990 to 1995 regarding
international abuses of women. The sexual violence in Bosnia was featured through
interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch from the victims of rape and “ethnic
cleansing” in Bosnia during the conflict. Additionally, Human Rights Watch reported on
the forcible impregnation, which they cited as a tool of “ethnic cleansing.” “Women
interviewed by Human Rights Watch described how they were gang-raped, taunted with
ethnic slurs, and cursed by rapists who stated their intention forcibly to impregnate
women as a haunting reminder of the rape and intensification of the trauma it inflicts.”42
Furthermore, this report reflected on the impact of the media attention on rapes
committed in Bosnia. Human Rights Watch cited the evolving public perception of rape
due to international organizations for women that advocated for the punishment and
condemnation of rape.43 This organization proposed further investigation into forced

40

Kristen Young, “UNHCR and ICRC in the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina,”
International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 83 no 843 (2001), 785.
41 Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Volume II (New York: Human
Rights Watch, 1993).
42
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women’s Human
Rights, New York (1995), 9.
43
Ibid., 10.
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impregnation as a form of “ethnic cleansing.”44 In publishing their findings, Human
Rights Watch increased awareness to this “ethnic cleansing” in the form of media
attention for the victims as well as further humanitarian aid for the women.
During the conflict, Human Rights Watch adopted a political stance, failing to
remain impartial. In a statement released in June of 1994, Human Rights Watch
denounced the UN and their failure to take direct action against the human rights
violations, claiming their failure had allowed the “ethnic cleansing” to spread and
resonate throughout Bosnia.45 Human Rights Watch demanded immediate action from
the UN to protect the remaining civilians in Bosnia from becoming victims of the “ethnic
cleansing.” By transmitting evidence of the violence in Bosnia, Human Rights Watch
assisted in bringing media attention to the genocide, which ensured public awareness of
the atrocities committed. Likewise, by taking a political stance and demanding action
from the UN, Human Rights Watch put additional pressure on the UN as an organization.
Humanitarian organizations were assisted by journalists in investigating the rape,
enslavement, and forced impregnation of Bosnian women, who “discovered” the
detention camps and published images from Trnopolje and Omarska in August of 1992.46
Roy Gutman, a journalist for Newsday, investigated the crimes in Bosnia, using his
reports to write A Witness to Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of
“Ethnic Cleansing” in Bosnia.47 Gutman first reported on the genocide in August, 1992,
using witness testimony of the women living in refugee centers on the ordered rape of 40

44

Ibid., 10.
Human Rights Watch, “War Crimes in Bosnia- Herzegovina: U.N Ceasefire Won’t
Help Banja Luka,” Human Rights Watch Vol. 6 no. 8 (June 1994).
46
Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
47
Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 140.
45
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Muslim women.48 Gutman’s was the first complete report of the rapes of Muslim women
by Serbian soldiers in August of 199249 accompanying the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) inspectors to several Serb detention facilities.50 His account of the
Bosnian genocide flooded Western and international media alike, bringing widespread
attention to the gender violence inflicted there. He also reported on the actions of the UN
and the ICRC. His reports on humanitarian actions revealed how ineffective the current
peacekeeping efforts were, “for foreign relief agencies the deployment of the British and
other forces under UN control is another case of inadequate humanitarian ‘Band-Aids’
that have no impact on the war itself.”51 Gutman outlined UN activity in investigating
and condemning the mass rape and violence in Bosnia. His reports on the violence in
Bosnia, as well as the limited action taken, exposed to the international community that
little to nothing had been done to prevent the genocide and sexual violence. “Reports in
Newsday and other publications, that the conquering Serb forces engaged in systematic
rape of Muslim and Croat women and minors, prompted a flurry of investigations by
international committees.”52 International journalists inserted themselves within the
conflict to record victim and witness testimony. At one point, approximately 5,000
journalists were reporting on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.53 The mass media
reports of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina became well known, “in the 18 month period
48

Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 38.
Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 25.
50
Gregory Kent, “Humanitarian agencies, Media and the War against Bosnia: ‘neutrality’
and Framing Moral Equalization in a Genocidal War of Expansion,” The Journal of
Humanitarian Assistance (August 2003).
51
Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 127.
52
Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 146.
53
Kirsten Young, “UNHCR and ICRC in the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and
Herzegovina,” IRRC Vol. 83 No. 843 (September 2001), add page number or end with
period
49
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between April 1992…and September 1993…139 media stories ran in major world
publications with ‘rape’ in Bosnia in the headline of their story.”54 In 1993, The Los
Angeles Times published “Testimony: A Trio of Women’s Voices Bear Witness to the
Horror of War and Rape as Yugoslavia Disintegrates.”55 This article used witness
testimony to expose the atrocities that women were facing. Western media was
instrumental in the promulgation of information and international attention to the crimes
of sexual violence, both during and after the Bosnian genocide. Extensive coverage of the
atrocities committed put pressure on the international community to respond.56
The distribution of information and first hand accounts of the war and violence in
Bosnia by journalists was possible due to the media support from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR began operations for
humanitarian relief efforts in Bosnia in 1992, and was assisted by the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in delivering humanitarian aid. The UNHCR established
relationships with media agencies, providing opportunities for journalists to report on the
front lines. Journalists were often issued UNHCR ID cards, which improved their access
throughout the region and, at times, were smuggled through checkpoints by UNHCR
officials.57 In locations that journalists could not access, the UNHCR provided them with
information that exposed the atrocities committed in those areas.58 The UNHCR had a
direct role in the mass media reports on the situation in Bosnia, intending to bring as
54

Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 125.
“Testimony: A Trio of Women’s Voices Bears Witness to the Horror of War and Rape
as Yugoslavia Disintegrates.” Los Angeles Times. January 31 1993.
56
Kent, “Humanitarian Agencies, Media and the War against Bosnia: ‘neutrality’ and
framing moral equalization in a Genocidal War of Expansion.”
57
Mark Cutts, “The Humanitarian operation in Bosnia 1992-95: dilemmas of negotiating
humanitarian access,” Working Paper No. 8, UNHCR.
58
Young, “UNHCR and ICRC in the former Yugoslavia,” 803.
55
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much attention to the violence in Bosnia. This participation was because of their
understanding of the importance of international journalists and the media. This tactic
incited condemnation for the inaction, and led to the condemnation of the UNHCR.
The reports of humanitarian organizations and media outlets and their demands
for action compelled political agencies to involve themselves in the conflict. However,
member nations of the UN wanted little to do with the conflict, which they considered a
civil war. It was not until the reports of sexual violence and “ethnic cleansing” arose that
nations made a concerted effort to understand the conflict. The United States (US) was
one of the first, and loudest, nations to take an interest in Bosnia. As the most powerful
member of the UN, the US had a substantial influence on UN policy and action. The US
conducted intelligence investigations on the “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The US had gathered intelligence on the detention camps in July 1992 prior
to these camps being exposed by the media.59 In 1993, the CIA documented “Rape as an
Instrument of Ethnic Cleansing,”60 This document outlined the severity of the genocide in
Bosnia at the time and uncovered 34 facilities where women were held and raped.61 The
Clinton administration was deeply concerned with the genocidal violence in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and because of the findings in the intelligence reports, President Bill
Clinton deployed a rhetoric denouncing the genocidal acts and pushed for action based on

Vaughn Shannon, “Judge and executioner: the politics of responding to ethnic
cleansing in the Balkans,” Journal of Genocidal Research 7 no.1 (2005), 55.
60
CIA Directorate of Intelligence Memorandum. “Rape as an Instrument of Ethnic
Cleansing.” 2 April 1993. Released October 2013 by CIA Historical Collections
Division.
61
“1993-04-02, Office of European Analysis Report re Rape as an Instrument of Ethnic
cleansing,” Clinton Digital Library.
59

Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2018

17

Voces Novae, Vol. 9 [2018], Art. 5

Brashear 17
America’s moral obligation.62 The US actively pressured the UN to aggressively pursue
an end to the violence, supporting the use of force in the conflict as well as the
establishment of the ICTY. However, the US was the only Security Council member who
campaigned for the use of military force in the form of airstrikes.63 The US campaigned
for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted airstrikes near the end of the
conflict, as Clinton feared that the credibility of NATO, and subsequently of the US, was
weakened by the failure to successfully intervene.64
American politicians such as Senator Bob Dole also demanded action, stating “it
was about whether some small country that had been ravaged on all sides, pillaged,
women raped and children killed—do they have any rights in this world?”65Key members
of the Clinton Administration such as National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and US
Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright called for military action based solely on the
humanitarian crisis. Advisor Lake issued a statement to President Clinton in 1993
advising the use of humanitarian airdrops to the Bosnian civilians.66 From the start, UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright made her desire for immediate military action evident.
Albright insisted that military intervention was a necessity to provide humanitarian
assistance as well as defense for the Bosnian civilians.67 Reports from the Clinton
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administration defined their intentions of sustaining democracy, claiming, “Escalating
violence and its potential spillover into other Balkan states would undercut US interests
in promoting democracy, economic reform, and regional cooperation.”68 These
documents exposed the early intentions of the Clinton Administration in regards to the
conflict in Bosnia. The Clinton Administration sought to retain the position of the US as a
world super-power, as well as preserve democratic institutions and alliances within
Europe. Differing objectives aligned in the campaign for the use of force to end the
conflict.
Other international bodies published reports of their own on the crimes committed
in the former Yugoslavia. The European Community initially sought to resolve the issue
in Yugoslavia in 1991, but as the conflict escalated and reports of “ethnic cleansing” rose,
the EC sent an investigative mission into Bosnia and reported their findings in 1993.69
The EC report stated that there were several thousand victims of rape, and that Serbian
soldiers forcibly impregnated and detained women until the pregnancy could not be
terminated.70 It openly denounced these acts as war crimes and called on fellow European
nations to act against the perpetrators. The EC, being a large political body of European
nations, had the visibility to encourage action against Serbian forces. However, “the EC
was an economic grouping without a mechanism for formulating or implementing foreign
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policy.”71 Despite its inability to bring real political change, it was still possible for the
EC to be used as a platform to condemn these atrocities. Furthermore, the EC submitted
their reports to the UN as evidence of the “ethnic cleansing” and sexual violence. The
involvement of the EC reflected the concern of European nations to the conflict as well as
their aversion to involvement.
Despite international attention and criticism, the UN constructed a limited
response. UN efforts in Bosnia involved peacekeeping efforts, instead of military action
to end the conflict. The UN presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina began with Security
Council Resolution 743 on February 21, 1992. This resolution mandated that
UNPROFOR deploy peacekeepers to the region.72 Following this resolution, official UN
involvement began on July 12, 1992.73 The UN deployed peacekeepers, but these
peacekeepers had no jurisdiction to protect and enforce. “As Serb artillery shells crashed
past the minarets into the center of this historic city [Travnik], British troops nearby
winced as they described their orders, which are to do nothing beyond guarding convoys
of humanitarian aid.”74 UNPROFOR was ordered to protect UNHCR in delivering
humanitarian aid and protecting ‘safe areas.’75 The UN limited its role in the conflict to
providing humanitarian relief and protection for those fleeing war zones.
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The UN conducted its own fact-finding missions after appointing a special
rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate the human rights
violations in the former Yugoslavia.76 On August 14, 1992 the Commission on Human
Rights appointed Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki to investigate the situation in
Bosnia after adopting resolution 1992/S-1/1.77 Mazowiecki conducted three missions into
Bosnia and Herzegovina, reporting to the UN Security Council after each mission. The
first was conducted from the 21st of August to the-26th of August 1992, the second from
the12th of October to the- 22nd of October 1992. After the third from January 12th to the
23rd of 1993, Mazowiecki requested that a team of medical experts investigate and report
on these allegations of mass rape and forced impregnation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.78
In a report to the Security Council, the special rapporteur included the findings from this
mission as well as documentation received from governments, intergovernmental
agencies, and other missions conducted by UN bodies regarding rape.79 It concluded that
rape was committed on a large scale by Serbian soldiers towards Muslim women. It also
stated that no attempts were made by Serbian leaders to stop or punish rape, and that rape
was used as a tool of “ethnic cleansing.”80 The findings of this mission and the statements
from the Mazowiecki revealed the dire need for UN intervention on a greater scale. The
76
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Commission on Human Rights additionally called for international bodies to submit their
findings to the UN Security Council in preparation for the establishment of a criminal
tribunal. This report also noted the similarity and lack of coordination among missions
conducted by the European Community, World Council of Churches, Amnesty
International, and Helsinki Watch.81 Multiple organizations reporting on the issue
brought attention to the situation, as well as the need for evidence of such reports.
Additionally, this report criticized the media for re-victimizing and exploiting women
with repeated interviews before these women were given the proper psychological or
social support. 82
The amassing of information on the atrocities committed in Bosnia led the UN to
establish the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Since 1991.83 By establishing this criminal tribunal, the UN
promoted its stance on human rights violations and their intentions to punish the
criminals behind it. Instead of acting to prevent the “ethnic cleansing,” the UN instead
reacted to the consequences of this genocide by establishing an international criminal
tribunal to convict the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations
of the laws or customs of war. The use of documented reports of human rights violations
became a vital tool in the development of the UN’s response to the genocide in Bosnia.
The amassing of reports by humanitarian organizations on the human rights violations
81
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would be useful for the documentation of violations by the ICTY. 84 The United Nations
requested these documented investigations be submitted to the Security Council as
evidence of war crimes that would allow the ICTY to begin prosecutions.
UN Resolution 808 initiated the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in February of 1993. The ICTY was established to bring justice to
those who violated international humanitarian law.85 Article 29 of the UN Charter
allowed the UN to exercise its power to establish the ICTY.86 The Statute of the ICTY
was drafted and approved with UN Resolution 827 on May 25, 1993.87 UN Resolution
827 affirmed the Statute of the ICTY to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention of 1949 and violations of laws and customs of war.88 Three judges made up
the tribunal panel and a prosecutor responsible for investigating and indicting criminals.89
The inception of an international tribunal arose from the public outcry over the published
reports of mass atrocities occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ICTY was
established to bring peace to the region and justice against the perpetrators of war crimes.
The conflict, however, did not end until the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in
December 1995.90 The ICTY was created in the midst of the conflict as a strategy for
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peace and as a way to temper public outrage over the inaction of international bodies in
during the war.
The establishment of an international criminal tribunal was meant to pressure the
conflicting parties into peace, as well as put individual responsibility on the perpetrators
of war crimes. UN Resolution 771 intended to publicize the information gathered by
international bodies for the international community in order to bring awareness about
those accountable for the war crimes.91 The resolution had a two-part purpose, as an
attempt to halt the “ethnic cleansing” and to gather evidence on violations of international
humanitarian law. The inception of the ICTY arose from the international demand for
action and from the minimal action taken to end the conflict previously. UN Resolution
780 established the UN Commission of Experts to collect evidence on war crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia.92 The commission published multiple reports on the
humanitarian crisis. The first interim report published in February of 1993 argued that an
international criminal tribunal would be necessary.93 Reports from the Commission of
Experts stated that countless breaches of the Geneva Convention occurred in BosniaHerzegovina and that systematic rape was part of the policy of “ethnic cleansing” being
perpetuated by Serbian soldiers.94 Activities of this commission included the exhumation
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of mass graves, investigating witness reports of mass rape and “ethnic cleansing.”95
Based on evidence found through their fact-finding missions and documents submitted to
the UN by additional investigative reports, the UN Security Council established the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
In preparation for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal, the
United Nations called upon other political bodies to submit their findings to the Security
Council. The EC submitted their report, “EC Investigative Mission into the Treatment of
Muslim Women in the Former Yugoslavia,” which was especially influential on the
decision to establish an international criminal tribunal, as indicated in UN Resolution
808. 9697 Stating that mass rape was used as a tool to force populations of Bosnian
Muslims to flee, in addition to other forms of humiliation and torture, the mission
emphasized the role of rape as part of “ethnic cleansing.” “Rape is part of the pattern of
abuse, usually perpetrated with the conscious intention of demoralizing and terrorizing a
community.”98 This report made the clear distinction between rape as a byproduct of war
and rape as a tool of war. The research conducted by the EC added substantial evidence
for the accusation of war crimes. This report, written by the EC and submitted to the UN
Security Council, provided evidence and reason to establish an international criminal
tribunal.
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The US had a major role in the establishment of the ICTY. The US strongly
supported the decision to establish a criminal tribunal and ensured its formation.99 The
United States government commended the establishment of the ICTY, with Albright
making evident US support in her statement regarding Resolution 808. “The Nuremberg
principles have been reaffirmed. The lesson that we are all accountable to international
law may finally have taken hold in our collective memory.”100 As the leading state in the
UN, US support for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal was
paramount. Without this unwavering backing, the formation of the ICTY would have
been unlikely. The US further supported the tribunal by being the largest financial
contributor to the ICTY.101 The tribunal employed a significant number of US citizens,
and those employed were in high-level positions. This presented an opportunity for the
US to influence tribunal proceedings.102 By playing a large role in the establishment of
the ICTY as well as in its continuation and procedures, the US displayed its support for
and influence on the ICTY.
It can be argued that the ICTY was established to remove pressure from the
international community to become militarily involved in the conflict. “The tribunal
appears to be more of a token to placate a disillusioned world than a symbol of the United
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Nations’ commitment to justice.”103 Public outcry against the genocide applied pressure
to the international community to involve itself in the conflict. The failures of UN
sanctions and arms embargos proved that military involvement would be necessary, and
international community demanded action against the crimes of genocide. However, no
nation was eager to act with force. The establishment of an international criminal tribunal
was in response to these demands.104 The creation of the ICTY was a strategy to avoid
military intervention, but this strategy failed as the war and “ethnic cleansing” continued
uninhibited. The end to this conflict was far on the horizon, and worse war crimes were
yet to come.
The massive scale and magnitude of rape and sexual violence in Bosnia required
the ICTY to thoroughly address these accusations and prosecute accordingly. However,
no international statute for the prosecution of sexual violence had been developed. The
ICTY reacted to the reported mass rape and forced pregnancy by instituting witness
protection and gender sensitive policies. The unique use of rape by Bosnian Serbs as part
of an official policy of war required the ICTY to develop specific gender sensitive
procedures to ensure that the rights and privacies of the victims and witnesses were
preserved.105 Due to international media attention and the activism of women’s groups,
the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence crossed a threshold into gender policies. The
UN made evident its intent to prosecute the perpetrators of mass rape with a resolution in
103
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February 1993 that defined rape as a war crime.106 This initial step defined the
development of international law in regards to women’s rights as the ICTY yielded
convictions of sexual violence as breaches of the Geneva Convention or the ICTY statute
as war crimes or as crimes against humanity.107 The ICTY established procedures for the
prosecution of cases of sexual violence where no such precedent had existed.
The particular attention on gender policies of the ICTY was credited to the action
of women’s advocacy groups, both international and local. Through various methods,
women’s groups campaigned for gender specific policies to be put into practice by the
ICTY. Such methods included letter writing campaigns, media work, protests, and
conferences.108 This brought international attention to crimes of sexual violence as well
as the obligation of the ICTY to prosecute them. The conversation on women’s rights
gained international recognition during the Bosnian genocide due to the burgeoning
women’s movement.109 Women’s advocacy groups had a variety of approaches; initially,
these groups focused on bringing international attention to the prevalence of crimes of
sexual violence in Bosnia. As women’s advocacy groups developed further, they
crusaded for the prosecution of perpetrators of sexual violence in addition to the
establishment of gender specific policies by the ICTY. The Association of Women
Victims of War, for example, provided support and aid for rape victims in Bosnia. This
organization mobilized victims and provided testimony for trials against sexual violence
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in the ICTY.110 They provided a platform for the victims of sexual violence to speak out
against the perpetrators of sexual violence. International women’s advocacy groups were
responsible for the ICTY explicitly defining rape as a war crime and a violation of human
rights.111 Through the campaigns of these advocacy groups, gender procedures were
implemented in the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. These policies provided for
greater precision in the prosecution of war criminals.
UN Resolution 808, which established the ICTY, prompted feminist scholars and
lawyers to formulate international gender policy for the consideration of the ICTY,
campaigning vigorously for the ICTY to implement gender sensitive procedures. After
Resolution 808, the International Women’s Human Rights Clinic of the City University
of New York (CUNY) Law School formulated the memorandum, Gender Justice and the
Constitution of the War Crimes Tribunal Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808.112
This memorandum was the initial step made by feminist scholars and lawyers for gender
sensitive policies in the ICTY. In 1993, it was distributed amongst women’s groups as
well as submitted to the Secretary General of the UN, the UN Commission of Experts,
the UN Security Council, and the UN office of Legal Counsel.
This memorandum insisted that rape, forced prostitution, and forced pregnancy
not only constituted crimes against humanity, but also grave breaches, regardless of the
110
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association with “ethnic cleansing.”113 This memorandum wanted the ICTY to address
rape and forced pregnancy as both a genocidal and a gendered attack. This was to ensure
that all forms of gender violence were prosecuted in the ICTY, not just crimes
associated with the “ethnic cleansing.” Additionally, these crimes were to be tried as
grave breaches and crimes against humanity, instead of solely the latter. The
memorandum condemned the crime of forced impregnation as especially egregious, and
insisted on the investigation and separation of this crime from rape or other sexual
violence.114 In regards to the functioning of the ICTY, this memorandum advocated for
women to be fully incorporated into every function of the ICTY. “The nature of the
Tribunal’s function, the prevalence of gender-specific violations in this war, and the
pervasiveness and subtlety of the gender-specific issues presented adds urgency to the
implementation of gender parity.”115 Furthermore, feminist scholars proposed that
gender sensitivity training be mandated in the judicial and prosecutorial staff of the
ICTY as well as the establishment of a sex crimes unit to provide support to the victims
of sexual violence who chose to testify.116 Mitigating any trauma that these victims
would encounter was imperative to proper gender protocol, as well as to ensure that
victims felt safe and secure to testify against their perpetrators. Particularly because of
the trauma these victims incurred, the memorandum suggested these protections.
Additionally, the memorandum insisted that the ICTY prosecute both those directly
responsible and those through command.117 This was especially important to the ICTY’s
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prosecution of sexual violence that was mandated from Serbian military command.
Those who ordered as well as those who condoned sexual violence would be prosecuted.
This addressed the systematic and widespread nature of the crimes of sexual violence.
This demand would ensure that sexual violence be prosecuted, whether as a genocidal
crime or as a gendered attack. This memorandum had substantial influence on the
development of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY. However, not all
their concerns were met under the initial institution of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
The proposal, Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and other Gender
Based Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A
Feminist Proposal and Critique, was prepared by the International Women’s Human
Rights Law Clinic at the City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law and the
Harvard Law School Human Rights Program.118 It was submitted to the ICTY judges at
their first session in November of 1993, then refined and again sent to the judges at their
second session in 1994. The refinements included critique of the initial “Rules of
Procedure and Evidence” and their suggested modifications, including definite and
mandated protections for the victims and witnesses, the inclusion of women within the
Judicial branch of the ICTY, and gender sensitive training for all staff within the
ICTY.119 Its purpose regarded gender violence in the ICTY as well as at the international
level, “we recognized that the Tribunal rules would serve a model for future international
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and national prosecutions of sexual crimes against women and provide international
standards for national law reform regarding the prosecution of sex crimes in civil
society.”120 Feminist scholars addressed the bigger picture of international gender policy
within their recommendations for the ICTY. The main focus of this proposal was the
establishment of gender sensitive procedures.
The rules established for the investigation, trial, and protection of
witnesses, and the understanding by all judges of the need for those rules,
will determine whether war crimes of sexual violence will be fairly
redressed with due regard for both rights of the accused and the protection
of the victims. These rules will thus be a very significant factor in whether
women ultimately come forward as complainants.121
In addition to providing commentary and proposals to the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, this proposal sought greater implementation of female staff in the ICTY. This
arose from the ICTY electing two female judges, which prompted a concern from
feminist human rights scholars that women would play a minimal role in the judiciary
and prosecutorial branch of the ICTY.122 Lastly, the proposal focused on protections for
the victims and witnesses testifying. This included identity concealment and the proper
admittance of evidence that ensured that the rights of the victims were maintained.
The suggestions from these proposals were implemented within the ICTY Rules
of Procedure and Evidence. This included Rule 34: The Victims and Witnesses Unit.
Rule 34 established that counseling and support would be provided for victims and
witnesses of sexual violence, as well as the incorporation of female staff.123 Suggestions
from these proposals were also implemented in Rule 69: Protection of Victims and
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Witnesses, which allowed the non-disclosure of the identity of victims and witnesses.124
This provided safety and protection for the victims, establishing a safe environment for
women to come forward to testify. Rule 75 provided further protections to witnesses and
victims, including the non-disclosure of witnesses to the media or public, testimony
through image altering or voice altering devices, the use of pseudonyms, and closed
sessions.125 Rule 96 dealt entirely with sexual violence. It established that no
corroboration of victim testimony would be required: consent would not be allowed as a
defense, that evidence must be proven credible and relevant, and the prior sexual history
of the victim could not be admitted.126 The establishment of Rule 96 is primarily due to
these proposals from feminist scholars and lawyers. The advocacy of feminist scholars
was paramount to the development of gender procedure in the ICTY as well as future
international tribunals.
Although their suggestions were widely implemented, feminist scholars still had
concerns over the ultimate effectiveness of the policies the ICTY put in place. The main
concern was with the lack of funding and staff for the Victims and Witnesses Unit.
Further, the Victims and Witnesses Unit did not provide legal advice or representation,127
which was especially problematic to feminist scholars. They argued that legal counsel
separate from the Office of the Prosecutor would provide victims with the proper
guidance and support necessary.128 Further concerns regarded women’s involvement in
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the Judicial and Prosecutorial branch of the ICTY. The presence of female prosecutors
and judges was paramount to feminist scholars. Despite this being among their initial
critique and proposal to the ICTY, women were not involved at the scale these feminist
scholars had hoped for.
Article 22 of the Statute for the ICTY, adopted May 1993, defined the
requirement for the ICTY to institute witness protection procedures.129 The ICTY
implemented Article 22 by the creation of the Victims and Witnesses Unit in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.130 The Victims and Witnesses Unit provided counseling and
support in cases of sexual violence. Additionally, this unit ensured the employment of
women to the ICTY.131 By enacting this rule, the ICTY indicated a focus on the health
and safety of the victims of sexual violence. The emphasis on the employment of women
by the ICTY was noteworthy. This specific rule revealed the appreciation the ICTY had
on the Bosnian genocide’s impact of women. While many people were victims, women
were specifically targeted in the genocidal campaigns of the Serbian army. This targeted
attack on women was addressed with the establishment of the Victims and Witnesses
Unit to provide counseling for the victims, as well as the large presence of women
employed in the ICTY.
Further protections for victims and witnesses were enacted through Rule 75,
which provided women privacy during court proceedings.132 Rule 75 allowed for the
anonymity of those testifying. For instance, the identity of a victim or witness would be
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concealed during testimony through the use of image or voice altering devices, closed
circuit television, assignments of pseudonyms, and closed sessions.133 All these
protections were put in place to create a comfortable and safe environment for the victims
of sexual violence, as fear of retribution or public opinion strongly influenced many of
these victims. To eliminate any fear of testifying, the ICTY promulgated this rule. By
providing a comfortable environment for victims and witnesses to testify, women were
encouraged to come forward, ensuring the proper prosecution and conviction of the
perpetrators of sexual violence.
Rule 96 regarded the admittance of evidence. It specifically directed that no
corroboration of testimony was required, that consent was not a defense, and that the
prior sexual history of the victim could not be admitted as evidence.134 The ICTY was
aware that the prosecution of cases of sexual violence would be difficult, as the only type
of evidence usually available was the testimony of the victims and other witnesses. These
types of cases were unique in this aspect. Through establishing witness protections, the
ICTY provided support and privacy for the victims and witnesses of sexual assault. By
preventing the argument of consent from being used, the ICTY acknowledged the
severity, scale, and the variety of forms that sexual violence had taken.
The procedures developed to protect the victims and witnesses of sexual violence
addressed gender rights in an international setting. These procedures brought visibility to
the victims of sexual violence and to the necessity to prosecute sexual violence.135 The
ICTY established that sexual violence was a crime that would no longer be overlooked,
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and that it would be prosecuted as a war crime, a crime against humanity, and as an
instrument of genocide.136 By focusing on procedures for the prosecution of cases
regarding sexual violence, the ICTY addressed women within the international
community and through their requirements for gender-specific legislation and
procedures,.137 An evolution of international criminal policy developed through the
formation of rules and procedures specifically concerning the victims of sexual assault.
The first international trial since Nuremberg and Tokyo, as well as the first to
address and prosecute sexual violence, was Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić. Tadić was
initially indicted in February of 1995 and his trial began in May of 1996.138 The ICTY
found Tadić guilty of crimes against humanity and in violation of laws and customs of
war. The Appeals Chamber convicted Tadić of grave breaches, crimes against humanity,
and violations of the laws or customs of war.139 Tadić had been the president of the
Bosnian Serb Democratic Party and participated in the takeover and “ethnic cleansing” of
Prijedor and Kozarac, in addition to the confinement of Muslim civilians at the Omarska
camp. His trial pertained to acts of sexual violence committed towards male victims at
the Omarska prison camp, in which Tadić was both a witness and perpetrator.140 While
this case was important in that it was the first to explicitly address crimes of sexual
violence in an international criminal tribunal, the issue had not yet been addressed for
female victims of sexual violence during the armed conflict in Bosnia. However, as the
first trial of the ICTY, the charges of sexual violence set the precedent for the ICTY to
136
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prosecute sexual violence. Tadić was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and released on
July 17, 2008.141
The Čelebići case involved the conviction of three men for war crimes including
rape and torture in the Čelebići prison camp in Bosnia. The Čelebići case determined the
responsibility that commanders have in the crimes committed by subordinates.142 Hazim
Delić, the deputy commander of the camp, was convicted for crimes of sexual violence in
the form of torture as a war crime. The judgment on Delić defined that the crime of rape
can be torture, as
Rape causes severe pain and suffering, both physical and
psychological…Furthermore, it is difficult to envisage circumstances
in which rape, by or instigation of a public official, or with the consent
or acquiescence of an official, could be considered as occurring for
a purpose that does not, in some way, involve punishment, coercion,
discrimination or intimidation. In the view of this Trial Chamber
this in inherent in situations of armed conflict. Accordingly,
whenever rape and other forms of sexual violence meet the
aforementioned criteria, then they shall constitute torture,
in the same manner as any other acts that meets these criteria.143
This classification had not yet been defined in international humanitarian law,
highlighting the importance of the Delić Judgment in forming the basis of rape as torture.
This definition would be used frequently in later convictions of sexual violence in the
ICTY. Zdravko Mucić, the commander of the Čelebići prison camp, was convicted for
his superior responsibility of the grave breaches of international law that occurred under
his supervision. His failure to prevent crimes of sexual violence, as well as his
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participation in them, resulted in multiple war crimes convictions.144 His conviction
established precedent in which superior officers could be held fully responsible for
crimes committed by subordinates under their authority. The charges of command
responsibility paved the way for prosecution of those acting under explicit orders to rape,
those aiding and abetting rape, as well as those with authority failing to prevent and
punish those committing rape.145 This ensured that justice would be brought to all those
involved. Mucić and Delić were convicted on November 16, 1998, a conviction that was
upheld on appeal on February 20, 2001.146 Mucić was sentenced to nine years and was
released on July 18, 2003.147 Delić was sentenced to 20 years and granted early release on
June 24, 2008.148 It is important to note that those accused in the Čelebići case were
Bosnian forces, committing crimes against Bosnian Serbs. The ICTY attempted to
prosecute all those who committed war crimes, on both sides. Bosnian and Croat forces
were prosecuted for perpetuating war crimes and sexual violence in Bosnia. All sides in
this conflict perpetuated sexual violence, and it was the mission of the ICTY to prosecute
all instances. As of September 2016, the 161 individuals that were prosecuted by the
ICTY, 94 were Serbs. However, 29 individuals were Croatian and nine were Bosnian.149
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Prosecutor vs. Kunarec set a precedent for convictions regarding sexual violence.
This case “was the first case on rape as a crime against humanity to come before the
Yugoslav Tribunal, and the first international trial in history to adjudicate rape and
enslavement for crimes essentially constituting sexual slavery.”150 The trial initiated the
process of convicting men for crimes of sexual enslavement and torture as crimes against
humanity. The basis for this conviction was the testimony of victims who were held
against their will by Dragoljub Kunarec, Radomir Kovač, and Zoran Vuković in private
homes for several months. During their confinement, Kunarec repeatedly raped his victims
and was charged on 11 counts solely regarding the sexual violence he committed.151 The
conviction of Kunarec for crimes of sexual violence exclusively was significant. The
majority of convictions by the ICTY involved elements of sexual violence; however, they
did not address crimes of sexual violence exclusively. The decision to establish rape as a
crime against humanity was the result of the blatant discrimination against Muslims that
Kunarec propagated during the armed conflict in Bosnia as well as his involvement with
the rape camps in Foça. The discrimination and persecution of women because of their
ethnicity, observed in the trial, aided in the ruling of rape as a crime against humanity.
“They therefore fully embraced the ethnicity-based aggression of the Serbs against the
Muslim civilians, and all their criminal actions were clearly part of and had effect of
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perpetrating the attack against the Muslim civilian population.”152 Prosecutor vs. Kunarec
established that crimes of sexual violence were serious and grave enough to prosecute
unaccompanied. Kunarec was convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity on
February 11, 2001, this conviction was upheld on appeal on June 12, 2002. He was
sentenced to 28 years imprisonment.153
Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić was significant in finding that sexual violence
could be used as evidence in prosecuting the crime of genocide. This case found that the
systematic rape of women in Bosnia and forced impregnation provided evidence for
“genocidal intent.”154 The ICTY made a distinction between independent cases of rape
and the systematic rapes that occurred in Bosnia. This distinction allowed for the
definition of systematic rape as a form of genocide.
On the basis of the features of all these sexual assaults, it may be inferred
that they were part of a widespread policy of ‘ethnic cleansing:’ the victims
were mainly non-Serbian civilians, the vast majority being Muslims. Sexual
assaults occurred in several regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a
systematic fashion and using recurring methods... They were performed
together with an effort to displace civilians and increase the shame and
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humiliation of the victims and of the community they belonged to in order to
force them to leave. 155
The connection drawn between the crimes of sexual violence and “ethnic cleansing”
established the genocidal intent of Serbian troops against the Bosnian population. The
ICTY defined that sexual violence was connected to the “ethnic cleansing,” contradicting
the notion that crimes of sexual violence are independent and unrelated to genocidal
intent. The ICTY established that perpetrators of sexual violence could be charged and
convicted for genocide. The conviction of genocide was brought before Radislav Krstić, a
commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, for his role in the Srebrenica massacre. Krstić was
convicted on counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or
customs of war, persecutions and murder. He was sentenced to 35 years in prison. The
conviction for persecution as crimes against humanity and the rape of women at Potočari
during the Srebrenica massacre was included.156
The participation of women in the ICTY was challenged and reaffirmed in the
Furundžija case. On appeal, Anto Furundžija attempted to discredit Judge Florence
Mumba as biased because of her participation in the UN Commission on the Status of
Women. Furundžija was convicted of violations of laws or customs of war, which
included rape, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.157 The defense attempted to
characterize Judge Mumba as having too much knowledge and influence on women’s
issues. Despite these attempts, the Appeals Court upheld the convictions and countered
155
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the claim of bias. The Appeals Court reminded the defense team that the tribunal was
established to prosecute crimes committed against women, and having a judge with
extensive knowledge on gender issues was intentional to accomplish this goal.158 The
ICTY regarded the role of women as prosecutors and judges as imperative to this
mission. The Furundžija case also structured a definition of rape that would be used by
the ICTY, defining it as:
(i) The sexual penetration, however slight:
(a) Of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator
or any other object used by the perpetrator; or
(b) Of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;
(ii) By coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third
person.159
This definition of rape would be used thereafter in the ICTY. Furundžija’s attempt to
discredit Judge Mumba failed, and instead reaffirmed the importance of women within
the ICTY.
While the ICTY was commended for introducing revolutionary legislation against
sexual violence in an international setting, criticisms of the ICTY were marked,
particularly from the failure to accomplish the initial goal of the ICTY, which was to
bring peace. The ICTY was established in 1993, with the intent to end the genocidal
violence by holding the perpetrators accountable.160 It was believed that if the soldiers
were aware that there would be consequences for their actions, in the form of a war
crimes tribunal, this would reduce their criminal acts. However, this notion proved
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incorrect as the conflict continued until late 1995.161 The violence in Bosnia and
Herzegovina did not cease until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December
of 1995.162 Nearly three years after the ICTY was mandated, a tentative peace was finally
established. The failures of the ICTY to establish peace in the midst of conflict is evident
in the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995.163 If a war crime tribunal did not have the
authority itself to end the violence, greater measures were necessary.
The conflict in Bosnia ended with the signing of the Dayton Accords on
December 14, 1995.164 The US was a proponent for NATO airstrikes early in 1995,
however the UN and subsequent member nations disagreed with the use of military force
because of the safety of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia. However, after the Srebrenica
massacre in July 1995, the international community agreed that NATO airstrikes would
be necessary to stop the increasing violence and genocide by Bosnian Serb forces. The
US, a founding member of NATO, had a key interest in maintaining their credibility as a
world power.165 In August of 1995, the two-week NATO airstrike campaign, Operation
Deliberate Force, began. These bombings hindered the Serbian effort, forcing Serbian
leaders to concede to peace discussions towards the end of 1995. Further efforts by
Muslim and Croatian forces gained headway in regaining territory from Serbia, and the
siege of Sarajevo was ended in September. By October, a nationwide cease-fire was
Barria and Roper, “How effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis
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mandated and peace talks began in Dayton, Ohio.166 The Dayton Peace Accords were
signed by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia and implemented in December
1995 at the leadership of US official Richard Holbrook.167 The Dayton Accords split
Bosnia and Herzegovina into two regions: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the Republika Srpska. NATO deployed forces to assist and oversee the implementation of
the Dayton Peace Accords.168 With peace now established, the UN would begin the
process of prosecuting war crimes. Without the NATO involvement and airstrikes, an end
to this conflict was unforeseeable. Despite reports of “ethnic cleansing” dating as early as
1992, the international community refused to take military action until the crimes of
Bosnian Serb forces could no longer be ignored. UN peacekeeping efforts had ultimately
failed, as NATO military force was necessary to end the violence. The UN faced severe
criticism for their failure to stop the violence and, now that the war had ended, the
international community looked skeptically towards UN efforts to prosecute the massive
instances of war crimes.
The Srebrenica massacre was the biggest failure of UN peacekeeping efforts.
Despite the initiation of the ICTY in 1993 and initial indictments released in 1994,
mandated violence against the civilian population in Bosnia peaked in July 1995.169 Not
only did the massacre reveal initial failures of the ICTY, but also UN peacekeeping
measures as a whole. The Srebrenica massacre was “the single worst atrocity committed
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in the former Yugoslavia during the wars of the 1990s and the worst massacre that
occurred in Europe since the months after World War II.”170 Srebrenica was declared a
safe area in 1993 and a cease-fire established, protected by UNPROFOR.171 However,
this proved short-lived as Bosnian Serb troops launched an attack on Srebrenica on July
6, 1995 that led to the fall of Srebrenica to Bosnian Serb forces on July 11, 1995.172 UN
peacekeeping officials were reluctant to use force against Bosnian Serb forces, thereby
allowing these forces to overtake Srebrenica with no interference.173 Upwards of 28,000
refugees in Srebrenica fled to the UN base at Potočari, where Bosnian Serb forces began
to transport civilians into Bosnian controlled territory. However, men aged 16 to 60 were
separated and the systematic murder of approximately 8,000 men occurred between July
11 and July 19.174 Women were victims of rape and sexual violence by Bosnian Serb
forces in Potočari while waiting to be transported. Human Rights Watch, The New York
Times, and The Independent published reports of rape and sexual abuse in the Srebrenica
massacre.175 It was the biggest failure of UN peacekeeping measures in the Bosnian War.
The ICTY indicted 19 individuals for the crimes committed in Srebrenica. Prosecutor v.
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Krstić found that genocide occurred in Srebrenica from July 11th to 19th, and General
Radislav Krstić was found guilty for his role in this massacre.176 The massacre revealed
the futility of UN established “safe areas” and discredited the notion that the mere
establishment of an international criminal court would deter forces from committing
further war crimes.
The ICTY failed to bring peace in the aftermath of the conflict as both Bosnian
and Serbian public sentiment regarded the ICTY with bitterness. Peace through
reconciliation was not met, as the ICTY created animosity among the differing
communities within Bosnia and Herzegovina.177 The Bosnian Muslim public reaction to
the ICTY was, for the most part, in support of its institution, however particular elements
in the prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes in the ICTY spurned resentment among
Bosnians. The largest complaint from Bosnian Muslims was that the sentences were too
short. In one instance, a former camp guard received relatively light sentence of eight
years for killing five inmates,178 and it was felt that the ICTY failed in achieving true,
lasting justice for the victims and their families. Another criticism regarded the failure to
hold all accountable. The ICTY convicted 161 people for violations of the international
humanitarian law.179 This number appeared too low for the majority of the Bosnian
Muslim population. Furthermore, massive public discontent was present in the ICTY's
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allowance of plea bargains. The Bosnian Muslim population was shocked that plea
bargains were put into practice in the ICTY, an option not present in their national court
system.180 The expectations of the Bosnian Muslims had fallen flat when the convictions
and practices of the ICTY were contrary to what they had hoped for.181 Negative
sentiment towards the ICTY in Bosnia was a result of the poor communication between
the tribunal and local institutions. Local expectations were not met because of the lack of
communication.182 The ICTY failed to connect with local organizations and women’s
groups. These organizations played a large role in interviewing and providing assistance
to victims of sexual assault, however, their potential to aid the ICTY was ignored.183
Establishing a relationship with local women’s organizations would have allowed the
ICTY to successfully prosecute a larger proportion of sexual assault because these
organizations worked directly with the victims.184 Efforts by the UN to alleviate the
communication block came too late for a substantial impact.
Serbia and the Republic of Srpska were largely against the ICTY. The vast
majority of Serbians disapproved of the practices and convictions of the ICTY.185 Their
criticism lay in their distrust of the ICTY, as well as their impression of false intent.
Serbians felt that the ICTY specifically targeted Serbians, and was not an independent
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body convicting all criminals in the Bosnian war.186 The distrust of the ICTY among
Serbians was largely because of the bias they felt in the indicting and sentencing of war
criminals. Because of the negative feelings towards the tribunal, Serbian cooperation was
slight, which created additional problems for the ICTY.187
International criticism of the ICTY regarded the problems of application, as
opposed to the concept of the tribunal. The ICTY was established in 1993, however
indictments did not initially go out until 1994. It took two years before the ICTY was
able to apprehend any of the first 34 indictments.188 Initially, the ICTY faced noncompliance in the international community to extradite the criminals.189 Further, critics
argued that it was impractical to initiate a criminal tribunal in the midst of an armed
conflict.190 The ICTY did not begin trials until 1996. Additional criticism of the ICTY
was in respect to the shortsightedness of its creators.191 The tribunal was not allocated the
proper funds for the effective prosecution of the war criminals. Furthermore, the ICTY
did not begin with an adequate number of judges for the process to run smoothly and
quickly.192 The ICTY originally tried one case at a time, drawing out the process
indefinitely for those waiting trial, an ineffective method for an international tribunal
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hoping to gain prominence and legitimacy among the international community.193 The
ICTY further struggled with obtaining evidence, largely because the ICTY was
established during an armed conflict. It was nearly impossible to gather evidence in
locations where the conflict was the most severe. Additionally, the majority of evidence
needed for prosecution was solely based on the testimony of the victims and witnesses.194
Feminist critique of the ICTY focused on the ICTY’s interpretation of rape in the
trials it prosecuted. In cases regarding sexual violence committed during the conflict, the
focus remained on rape as a crime against the community, rather than a crime against the
specific women. This led to a patriarchal understanding of rape within the context of the
ICTY.195 Feminist criticism was on the treatment of victims of rape and sexual violence
as witnesses to the crimes, instead of the victims.196 This treatment created a divide
between the victim and the assault committed against them. The ICTY ignored the
ongoing suffering these women faced from the aftermath rape due to the rules of
relevancy. These victims were unable to share their ongoing struggles of their
victimization and rape. This removed ownership from the victims, who did not feel that
they had been brought justice.197
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Feminist scholars continued to debate as to how the tribunal should prosecute rape in this
specific circumstance. The debate was divided on the prosecution of rape as genocide.
Scholar Catherine MacKinnon argued at the onset of the ICTY:
Like all rape, genocidal rape is particular as well as part of the generic,
and its particularity matters. This is ethnic rape as an official policy of war
in a genocidal campaign for political control…It is specifically rape under
orders. This is not rape out of control. It is rape under control. It is also
rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make the victims
wish they were dead. It is rape as an instrument of forced exile, rape to
make you leave your home and never want to go back…It is rape to drive
a wedge through a community, to shatter a society, to destroy a people. It
is rape as genocide.198
MacKinnon was the main proponent to prosecute rape as genocide in the ICTY, arguing
that rape could occur simultaneously as an act of war and genocide. A separate camp of
feminists largely critiqued this viewpoint, fearing that charging rape as genocide would
make it difficult to establish other convictions on rape. Rhonda Chopelon led the
opposition against charging rape as genocide. She argued that rape outside of the context
of genocide would be ignored. Because rape was committed on such a large scale in this
conflict, every instance of this crime should be prosecuted, not just instances of rape as
genocide.199 Chopelon’s argument succeeded, as rape was charged in the ICTY as crimes
against humanity, grave breaches, and violations of laws and customs of war.200 While
genocidal intent was apparent, the ICTY did not bring charges of genocide in relation to
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sexual violence and forced impregnation.201 This was one of the largest critiques in
feminist scholarship of the ICTY. For example, the Kunarec trial had many elements of
genocidal intent, however no charges were brought.202 Testimonies from the victims in
the Kunarec trial revealed the intent for Bosnian Muslim women to give birth to Serbian
babies.203 This forced impregnation could have been charged as genocide. One of the few
convictions of genocide in the ICTY was against Radislav Krstić for his role in the
Srebrenica massacre.204 No genocide charges were brought forward for the crimes of
forced impregnation. This crime has largely been ignored in the ICTY, despite its
genocidal intent. While feminist scholars agreed that the ICTY was imperative to bring
justice to Bosnia, and that it made progress in the jurisdiction of sexual violence, the
ICTY failed to correctly and fully address the crimes of sexual violence in Bosnia for
what they truly were: attacks on Bosnian women because they were women.
To further analyze the successes and failures of the ICTY, the reflections of
former ICTY Judge and President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald are essential. McDonald
served as a judge for the ICTY in 1993 and as president from 1997 to 1999. Prior to her
time with the tribunal, McDonald was an American civil rights lawyer who worked with
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the NAACP and as a federal judge in Texas.205 The election of a female American civil
rights lawyer as one of the original judges in the ICTY, and later president impacted the
structure of the ICTY; particularly, how the ICTY addressed sexual violence in the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence. The previous absence of women in the roles of lawmakers
and enforcers explained the lack of prosecution of sexual violence prior to the ICTY.206
In 1993, with the establishment of the ICTY and the appointment of McDonald as a
judge, witness and victim protections would be seriously considered and put in place,
which allowed sexual violence to be sufficiently prosecuted.
As one of the original 11 judges, McDonald participated in the formulation of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Of the 11 judges, only two were women: McDonald
and Elizabeth Odio Benito. They were the first women to be instituted into an
international court as judges.207 McDonald took the lead in formulating Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, relying on US law to build the law’s framework.208 McDonald
took special interest in the matters of sexual assault in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.209 She relied heavily on the proposal submitted to the ICTY by the
International Women’s Human Rights Clinic at CUNY Law School. The suggestions
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made in this proposal pertained to rights of the victims of sexual violence, ensuring that
the victim would not become the accused during the trial.210 McDonald’s particular
interest in the sexual violence as well as her reliance on this proposal to create the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence instituted protections for victims of sexual violence that were
never before used in an international court. As a leading voice among the judges,
McDonald used US law as well as proposals from American women’s advocacy groups
to devise the protections for victims and witnesses while still upholding the rights of the
accused.211
In McDonald’s reflections on the ICTY, she observed how uncomfortable men
acted on the issue of sexual assault, stating “you know, I think as I sat through trials and
consideration of the issue, there is a certain sense, a certain, I don’t want to say
‘sensitivity,’ a certain ‘reaction’ that men have to this whole business of sexual
assault.”212 As a woman in her position, McDonald ensured the inclusion of sexual
assault in indictments as well, even confronting the prosecutor on the absence of sexual
assault in several of the indictments.213 Her observation on the reactions to sexual assault
reflected the importance of the implementing women in high positions in the ICTY.
McDonald reflected on her time with the ICTY, particularly its effectiveness as a
whole. Her main criticism of the ICTY regarded the lack of enforcement. While the
Statute of the ICTY stated that compliance among nations is required, no system to
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enforce this was present.214 Non-compliance was widespread in the initial years of the
ICTY, especially among the former Yugoslavian nations of Serbia, Republika Srpska,
and Croatia in addition to other member nations of the UN.215
By way of example, while over seventy people had been indicted by mid1997, only eight were in custody. States were reluctant to provide staff or
funds, declined to order the 60,000 peacekeepers in Bosnia to assist what
few investigations the prosecutor had, and it had been said, refused to
provide it the intelligence information that would have allowed the
investigation of those who instigated and directed the violence.216
The lack of support for the ICTY made the initial years problematic for McDonald and
the other judges. Antonio Cassese, the first president of the ICTY, reported noncompliance five separate times to the Security Council.217 At the onset of McDonald’s
presidency in 1997, cooperation had increased substantially due to international activist
efforts. However, non-compliance once again became an issue after the conflict in
Kosovo began. This resulted in McDonald reporting non-compliance to the Security
Council six times within one year.218 Without enforcement capabilities there was little
McDonald or others could do in regards to state non-compliance.
During the two years that McDonald served as president, she expanded the ICTY
and adopted measures to bring about expedited trials. Indictments that had been made
years before were beginning to transition to trial. In response to the influx of cases at
trial, McDonald requested three additional judges, as well as two additional courtrooms.
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Additionally, she adapted the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in 1998 to include new
rules for trial efficiency.219 Because of her expansion of the ICTY, it was possible to
hold multiple trials simultaneously, which alleviated the backup of cases.
McDonald observed the lack of interest in the ICTY in the US, but more importantly,
the lack of awareness and understanding of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia.220 The
misrepresentation of the ICTY was extensive in the former Yugoslavia, particularly
because of the distance of The Hague from the actual site of the crimes.221 McDonald
responded to the misconceptions of the ICTY by establishing the Outreach Programme
in 1999. The Outreach Programme promoted the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia by
providing information on the accomplishments and works of the ICTY.222 The efforts in
the Outreach Programme also included bringing judges and lawyers from the former
Yugoslavia to The Hague who “watched the trials, they could speak one-on-one to the
judges, they spoke to the Victims and Witnesses Unit, the prosecutors, and the Registry,
the whole thing. They got an understanding that we’re not sitting in The Hague with
horns, trying to go after any group of people.”223 The Outreach Programme attempted to
dispel misconceptions of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia.
McDonald’s reflections on the ICTY involved the difficulties she faced as a judge
and president, yet she still concluded positively on the work of the ICTY. “The Tribunal
has expanded the jurisprudence of international humanitarian law. Secondly, it has
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demonstrated that the rule of law is an integral part of the peace process. Third, the
tribunal has proved that international criminal justice is possible.”224 McDonald
commended the ICTY for the procedure it established, which would be implemented by
other international and national bodies. Additionally, McDonald acknowledged the
awareness that the ICTY brought to the violations of human rights and the need to
prosecute these violations.225 At the local level, the ICTY allowed for the possibility of
reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia by prosecuting the criminals, developing law to
be established in local courts, and by allowing victims to put their suffering on record.226
The UN sought to reflect the effectiveness of the ICTY on prosecuting sexual
violence. Resolution 1820, adopted by the Security Council on June 19, 2008, analyzed
the development of international gender justice and called for the Security Council to
release a review on the ad hoc international criminal tribunals of Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
and the Special court for Sierra Leone.227 This Resolution was part of the UN response to
gender violence in the wake of the new century.
Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of those adversely affected
by armed conflict; that women and girls are particularly targeted by the use
of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill
fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or
ethnic group.228
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The international attention on the crimes of sexual violence in Bosnia led to the UN’s
implementation of policies for the sole purpose of addressing and eliminating sexual
violence. Documents such as Resolution 1820 were published by the UN Security
Council in the wake of concentrated gender violence, not only in Bosnia, but in Rwanda
and Sierra Leone as well.229 Its purpose of the resolution was to analyze the efficacy of
international criminal tribunals in addressing and implementing proper procedures to
successfully convict perpetrators of sexual violence.
In response to Resolution 1820, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
published the Review of the Sexual Violence Elements of the Judgments of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the light of Security
Council Resolution 1820 in March of 2009.230 This review provided an in-depth analysis
of the cases from ICTY regarding convictions for sexual violence. A significant finding
in this review addressed the nature of sexual violence in Bosnia:
At the ICTY, a noticeable feature of relevant judgments is that sexual
violence against civilians formed part of and flowed from the so-called
‘ethnic cleansing’ of areas coveted by parties to the conflict. Sexual violence
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centering on detention centres, including in situations amounting to sexual
slavery of women and girls, comprise a considerable part of the findings231
Furthermore, the ICTY did not limit its judgments on sexual violence to instances of rape
as a crime against humanity. Sexual violence in the form of torture, enslavement and
persecution were tried as war crimes as well as a crime against humanity.232 The ICTY
addressed the multiplicity of the types of sexual violence in the Bosnian genocide. This
review outlined specific cases in which men were convicted for crimes of sexual violence
as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. As of September 2016, 78
individuals were indicted for crimes including sexual violence and 32 were convicted for
crimes of sexual violence. 14 individuals were acquitted for charges of sexual violence,
nine died before the end of their trial, and six cases were transferred to a national
jurisdiction. Lastly, 11 cases involving charges of sexual violence were still in trial in as
of September, 2016.233 When comparing these numbers to the estimated tens of
thousands instances of rape, it is difficult to maintain the success of the ICTY in bringing
justice to the victims of sexual violence. The ICTY set an international standard for
prosecuting sexual violence. The efforts of this tribunal, despite the apparent low
numbers, cannot be ignored. Without any prior jurisdiction, the ICTY managed to
formulate extensive procedures to safeguard the rights of the victims and witnesses of
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sexual violence, enabling victims to come forward and testify against their perpetrators
without fear of retaliation. Further, the ICTY expanded the way in which sexual violence
was prosecuted under crimes against humanity, grave breaches, and genocide. The
casework from the ICTY on sexual violence was imperative to the future of prosecuting
sexual violence in the international tribunals to come.
The ICTY initiated a precedent in prosecuting sexual violence, which would be
carried on through subsequent international tribunals. The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established in 1994, followed the example of the ICTY in
convicting sexual violence. The ICTR also set its own precedent for prosecuting sexual
violence. Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR was able to prosecute rape as genocide and
establish a solid definition of rape. The Akaseyu case rendered the decision:
The Chamber defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual
violence includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which
is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. This act
must be committed:
(a) as part of a widespread or systematic attack;
(b) on a civilian population
(c) on certained catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic,
political, racial, or religious grounds. 234
The Akaseyu case improved the definition of rape. The ICTR followed the model of the
ICTY closely in prosecuting sexual violence, even improving on it. Further, the ICTR
was able to charge rape as genocide. The Akaseyu case held that rape and sexual violence
constituted genocide in the attack on Tutsi women.235 Akaseyu was found guilty of
Genocide and Crimes against Humanity for extermination, murder, torture, rape, and
234
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inhuman acts on September 2, 1998.236 Decisions rendered in the ICTR revealed that the
ICTY was effective in establishing a guideline for the prosecution of sexual violence. By
improving on the definitions of sexual violence in the ICTY, the ICTR developed
significant casework that would not have been possible without the influence of the
ICTY.
The ICTY further influenced the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC). The Rome Statute was signed July 17, 1998, which established the ICC.237 ICTY
standards for prosecuting sexual violence influenced the Rome Statute prohibiting rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization as
crimes against humanity and war crimes in international and non-international armed
conflicts.238 Jurisdiction from the ICTY as well as the campaigning of the Women’s
Caucus ensured that sexual violence would no longer be ignored under international law.
Sexual violence was no longer listed under “outrages upon personal dignity.”239 The
Rome Statute utilized the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence in formulating gender
policy as well. The ICC established that corroboration was not necessary and that consent
and sexual history of the victim would not be admissible as evidence.240 The influence of
the ICTY on the Rome Statute was evident. Further, the ICC built a more comprehensive
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framework for the prosecution of sexual violence.241 Through the precedents established
in the ICTY, gender violence was no longer considered a by-product of war or an attack
on one’s honor. The ICTY established that sexual violence would be prosecuted, how it
would be prosecuted, and protections for those victims and witnesses of sexual
violence.242 As the first international criminal tribunal to prosecute sexual violence in its
totality, the ICTY was the groundwork for future tribunals.
Although sexual violence has always been an element of war, it was largely
ignored, and treated as though it were impossible to avoid. It was not until the ICTY that
sexual violence was realized for what it was, a violent attack on women that should be
prosecuted under international humanitarian law. The reports from humanitarian
organizations, the media, and political organizations during the Bosnian conflict
influenced this new understanding. Furthermore, the larger women’s movement and
newfound feminist advocacy prompted the UN to fully address the issue of gender
violence in war. Sexual violence was now considered severe enough to prosecute
through the action of Western media and aid during the Bosnian conflict. To address the
criticism of Western media and aid, the UN established the ICTY, which defined its
stance on women’s rights violations and their intention to punish the criminals behind it.
The ICTY formulated the procedures for later tribunals to follow in prosecuting sexual
violence.
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